Volume 16 (2021)

A model of weighted network formation
        Leonie Baumann
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1–23
Asymptotic synthesis of contingent claims with controlled risk in a sequence of discrete-time markets
        David M. Kreps and Walter Schachermayer
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25–47
A Maximum Likelihood Approach to Combining Forecasts
        Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin
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49–71
Convergence in models of misspecified learning
        Paul Heidhues, Botond Koszegi, and Philipp Strack
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
73–99
Voting in corporations
        Alan D. Miller
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101–128
Testable forecasts
        Luciano Pomatto
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
129–160
Information aggregation in competitive markets
        Lucas Siga and Maximilian Mihm
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161–196
Chain stability in trading networks
        Scott Duke Kominers, John William Hatfield, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp
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197–234
Agendas in legislative decision-making
        Sean Horan
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235–274
Macro-financial volatility under dispersed information
        Jianjun Miao, Jieran Wu, and Eric R. Young
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 Supplementary Appendix
275–315
A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks
        Manuel Mueller-Frank and Claudia Neri
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317–357
Bounded rationality and limited datasets
        Geoffroy de Clippel and Kareen Rozen
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359–380
On selecting the right agent
        Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, and Kareen Rozen
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381–402
Evolution, heritable risk and skewness loving
        Yuval Heller and Arthur J. Robson
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 Supplemental Zip
403–424
Local agency costs of political centralization
        Roger B. Myerson
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
425–448
Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
        Harry Pei
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
449–475
Costly miscalibration
        Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
477–506
Constrained preference elicitation
        Yaron Azrieli, Christopher P. Chambers, and Paul J. Healy
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
507–538
Random ambiguity
        Jay Lu
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
539–570
Delegating learning
        Juan F. Escobar and Qiaoxi Zhang
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
571–603
Communication with forgetful liars
        Philippe Jehiel
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
605–638
Sequential persuasion
        Fei Li and Peter Norman
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
639–675
The implementation of stabilization policy
        Olivier Loisel
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
677–716
Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes
        Ignacio Esponda and Demian Pouzo
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
717–757
Approval voting without ballot restrictions
        Federica Ceron and St├ęphane Gonzalez
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
759–775
Simple bets to elicit private signals
        Aurelien Baillon and Yan Xu
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
777–797
Revenue from matching platforms
        Philip Marx and James Schummer
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
799–824
Cooperative strategic games
        Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
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825–851
When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
        Alexey I. Kushnir and Lev V. Lokutsievskiy
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
853–879
Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
        Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
881–909
Matching with floor constraints
        Sumeyra Akin
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
911–942
A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement
        Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
943–978
Bounds on price setting
        Narayana R. Kocherlakota
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
979–1015
Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries and competing paths of diffusion in networks
        Mihai Manea
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary Appendix
1017–1053
Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games
        Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1055–1093
Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
        Carolina Manzano and Xavier Vives
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1095–1137
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
        Yunan Li
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1139–1194
Local global equivalence in voting models: a characterization and applications
        Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, and Huaxia Zeng
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1195–1220
Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: dispensing with public randomization
        Paulo Barelli and John Duggan
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1221–1248
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
        Battal Dogan and Lars Ehlers
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1249–1279
Payoff implications of incentive contracting
        Daniel F. Garrett
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1281–1312
Monitoring experts
        Yaron Azrieli
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1313–1350
Robust group strategy-proofness
        Steven Kivinen and Norovsambuu Tumennasan
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1351–1389
Relational communication
        Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1391–1430
Robust sequential search
        Karl H. Schlag and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1431–1470
Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
        Rumen Kostadinov
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1471–1512
Sustainable debt
        Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis, and Yiannis Vailakis
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1513–1555
Bayesian privacy
        Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz, and Xiaosheng Mu
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1557–1603
The implications of finite-order reasoning
        Adam Brandenburger, Alexander Danieli, and Amanda Friedenberg
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1605–1654
Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
        Ran Eilat and Ady Pauzner
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1655–1714