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A model of weighted network formation
Leonie Baumann |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–23 |
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Asymptotic synthesis of contingent claims with controlled risk in a sequence of discrete-time markets
David M. Kreps and Walter Schachermayer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 25–47 |
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A Maximum Likelihood Approach to Combining Forecasts
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 49–71 |
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Convergence in models of misspecified learning
Paul Heidhues, Botond Koszegi, and Philipp Strack |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 73–99 |
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Voting in corporations
Alan D. Miller |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 101–128 |
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Testable forecasts
Luciano Pomatto |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 129–160 |
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Information aggregation in competitive markets
Lucas Siga and Maximilian Mihm |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 161–196 |
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Chain stability in trading networks
Scott Duke Kominers, John William Hatfield, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 197–234 |
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Agendas in legislative decision-making
Sean Horan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 235–274 |
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Macro-financial volatility under dispersed information
Jianjun Miao, Jieran Wu, and Eric R. Young |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 275–315 |
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A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks
Manuel Mueller-Frank and Claudia Neri |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 317–357 |
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Bounded rationality and limited datasets
Geoffroy de Clippel and Kareen Rozen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 359–380 |
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On selecting the right agent
Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, and Kareen Rozen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 381–402 |
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Evolution, heritable risk and skewness loving
Yuval Heller and Arthur J. Robson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplemental Zip 403–424 |
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Local agency costs of political centralization
Roger B. Myerson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 425–448 |
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Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
Harry Pei |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 449–475 |
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Costly miscalibration
Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 477–506 |
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Constrained preference elicitation
Yaron Azrieli, Christopher P. Chambers, and Paul J. Healy |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 507–538 |
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Random ambiguity
Jay Lu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 539–570 |
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Delegating learning
Juan F. Escobar and Qiaoxi Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 571–603 |
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Communication with forgetful liars
Philippe Jehiel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 605–638 |
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Sequential persuasion
Fei Li and Peter Norman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 639–675 |
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The implementation of stabilization policy
Olivier Loisel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 677–716 |
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Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes
Ignacio Esponda and Demian Pouzo |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 717–757 |
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Approval voting without ballot restrictions
Federica Ceron and Stéphane Gonzalez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 759–775 |
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Simple bets to elicit private signals
Aurelien Baillon and Yan Xu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 777–797 |
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Revenue from matching platforms
Philip Marx and James Schummer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 799–824 |
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Cooperative strategic games
Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 825–851 |
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When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
Alexey I. Kushnir and Lev V. Lokutsievskiy |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 853–879 |
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Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Errata 881–909 |
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Matching with floor constraints
Sumeyra Akin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 911–942 |
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A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement
Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 943–978 |
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Bounds on price setting
Narayana R. Kocherlakota |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 979–1015 |
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Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries and competing paths of diffusion in networks
Mihai Manea |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1017–1053 |
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Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games
Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1055–1093 |
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Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
Carolina Manzano and Xavier Vives |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1095–1137 |
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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Yunan Li |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1139–1194 |
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Local global equivalence in voting models: a characterization and applications
Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, and Huaxia Zeng |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1195–1220 |
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Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: dispensing with public randomization
Paulo Barelli and John Duggan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1221–1248 |
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Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Battal Dogan and Lars Ehlers |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1249–1279 |
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Payoff implications of incentive contracting
Daniel F. Garrett |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1281–1312 |
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Monitoring experts
Yaron Azrieli |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1313–1350 |
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Robust group strategy-proofness
Steven Kivinen and Norovsambuu Tumennasan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1351–1389 |
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Relational communication
Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1391–1430 |
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Robust sequential search
Karl H. Schlag and Andriy Zapechelnyuk |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1431–1470 |
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Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
Rumen Kostadinov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1471–1512 |
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Sustainable debt
Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis, and Yiannis Vailakis |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1513–1555 |
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Bayesian privacy
Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz, and Xiaosheng Mu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1557–1603 |
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The implications of finite-order reasoning
Adam Brandenburger, Alexander Danieli, and Amanda Friedenberg |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1605–1654 |
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Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
Ran Eilat and Ady Pauzner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1655–1714 |