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Exploiting social influence in networks
Vladyslav Nora and Eyal Winter |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–27 |
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A dynamic model of censorship
Yiman Sun |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 29–60 |
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Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions
Vitali Gretschko and Helene Mass |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 61–93 |
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Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
Mengxi Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 95–129 |
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Digital currency and privacy
Kee-Youn Kang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 131–167 |
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Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers
Maria Betto and Matthew W. Thomas |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 169–206 |
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Optimal sequential contests
Toomas Hinnosaar |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 207–244 |
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Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
Sarah Auster and Nicola Pavoni |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 245–284 |
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Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
Xuesong Huang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 285–324 |
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Asset bubbles and product market competition
Francisco Queirós |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 325–364 |
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The dynamics of instability
César Barilla and Duarte Gonçalves |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 365–405 |
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Data and incentives
Annie Liang and Erik Madsen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 407–448 |
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Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
J. Aislinn Bohren |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 449–498 |
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Wages as signals of worker mobility
Yu Chen, Matthew Doyle, and Francisco M. Gonzalez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 499–549 |
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Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
Özgün Ekici |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 551–564 |
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Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions
Paulo Barelli and Srihari Govindan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 565–582 |
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Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules
Sanket Patil and Yuval Salant |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 583–604 |
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Symmetric reduced form voting
Xu Lang and Debasis Mishra |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 605–634 |
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Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
Yiqiu Chen and Markus Möller |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 635–666 |
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A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 667–703 |
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Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information
Shanglyu Deng, Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, and Yuxuan Zhu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 705–742 |
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On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks
Giorgio Fabbri, Silvia Faggian, and Giuseppe Freni |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 743–781 |
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Direct implementation with evidence
Soumen Banerjee, Yi-Chun Chen, and Yifei Sun |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 783–822 |
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Relational enforcement
Peter Achim and Jan Knoepfle |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 823–863 |
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Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 865–915 |
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Contracting over persistent information
Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou, and Tristan Tomala |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 917–974 |
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Efficient incentives with social preferences
Thomas Daske and Christoph March |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 975–999 |
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Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
Francisco Silva |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1001–1026 |
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Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation
V. Bhaskar, Wojciech Olszewski, and Thomas Wiseman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1027–1055 |
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Dynamic information preference and communication with diminishing sensitivity over news
Jetlir Duraj and Kevin He |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1057–1086 |
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Correlated choice
Christopher P. Chambers, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, and Christopher Turansick |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1087–1117 |
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Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games
Jean Barthelemy and Eric Mengus |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1119–1150 |
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Robust performance evaluation of independent agents
Ashwin Kambhampati |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1151–1184 |
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A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
Xiang Han |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1185–1221 |
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Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in stochastic dynamic programming
Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1223–1260 |
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Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
Guilherme Carmona and Krittanai Laohakunakorn |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1261–1304 |
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Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences
Charles Louis-Sidois and Leon Andreas Musolff |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1305–1349 |
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Bayesian social aggregation with almost-objective uncertainty
Marcus Pivato and Tchouante Ngamo Elise Flore |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1351–1398 |
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Distributions of posterior quantiles via matching
Anton Kolotilin and Alexander Wolitzky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1399–1413 |
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Boundedly rational demand
Pavel Kocourek, Jakub Steiner, and Colin Stewart |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1415–1442 |
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On bargaining norms as solutions to cost-minimization problems
Tymon Tatur |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1443–1472 |
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An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium
Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1473–1504 |
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Innovation adoption by forward-looking social learners
Mira Frick and Yuhta Ishii |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1505–1541 |
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Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation
Philippe Jehiel and Konrad Mierendorff |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1543–1579 |
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Extensive measurement in social choice
Jacob M. Nebel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1581–1618 |
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The property rights theory of production networks
Ivan Balbuzanov and Maciej H. Kotowski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1619–1658 |
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Robust predictions in dynamic policy games
Juan Passadore and Juan Pablo Xandri Antuna |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1659–1700 |
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The persuasion duality
Piotr Dworczak and Anton Kolotilin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1701–1755 |