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Job security, stability and production efficiency
Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi, and Rann Smorodinsky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–24 |
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A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
René Kirkegaard |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 25–51 |
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Auction design without quasilinear preferences
Brian Baisa |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 53–78 |
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On the existence of approximate equilibria and sharing rule solutions in discontinuous games
Philippe Bich and Rida Laraki |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 79–108 |
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Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem
Péter Eső and Balázs Szentes |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 109–139 |
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Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry
Lixin Ye and Chenglin Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 141–173 |
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Directives, expressives, and motivation
Toru Suzuki |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 175–210 |
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Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
Salvador Barberà and Anke Gerber |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 211–247 |
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Repeated Nash implementation
Claudio Mezzetti and Ludovic Renou |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 249–285 |
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Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
Marek Pycia and Utku Unver |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 287–329 |
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How do you defend a network?
Marcin Konrad Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 331–376 |
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Allais, Ellsberg, and preferences for hedging
Mark Dean and Pietro Ortoleva |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 377–424 |
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Career concerns with exponential learning
Alessandro Bonatti and Johannes Hörner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 425–475 |
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Choosing on influence
Tugce Cuhadaroglu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 477–492 |
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General revealed preference theory
Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 493–511 |
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Multinary group identification
Wonki Jo Cho and Biung-Ghi Ju |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 513–531 |
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On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games
Mohammed Ali Khan, Kali P. Rath, Haomiao Yu, and Yongchao Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 533–554 |
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A theory of political gridlock
Juan Ortner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 555–586 |
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One dimensional mechanism design
Hervé Moulin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 587–619 |
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Rationally inattentive preferences and hidden information costs
Henrique de Oliveira, Tommaso Denti, Maximilian Mihm, and Kemal Ozbek |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 621–654 |
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Social distance and network structures
Ryota Iijima and Yuichiro Kamada |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 655–689 |
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Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 691–729 |
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Competing with asking prices
Benjamin Lester, Ludo Visschers, and Ronald Wolthoff |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 731–770 |
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Modeling infinitely many agents
Wei He, Xiang Sun, and Yeneng Sun |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 771–815 |
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Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs
Juan Ortner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 817–861 |
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Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
Daniel Fragiadakis and Peter Troyan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 863–908 |
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Magical thinking: A representation result
Brendan Daley and Philipp Sadowski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 909–956 |
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Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection
Daniel Barron |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 957–978 |
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Equilibria in symmetric games: theory and applications
Andreas Hefti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 979–1002 |
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Preventing bank runs
David Andolfatto, Ed Nosal, and Bruno Sultanum |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1003–1028 |
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Choice overload and asymmetric regret
Gökhan Buturak and Özgür Evren |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1029–1056 |
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Friends and enemies: a model of signed network formation
Timo Hiller |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1057–1087 |
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Bayesian games with a continuum of states
Ziv Hellman and Yehuda Levy |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1089–1120 |
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Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks
Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis, and Yiannis Vailakis |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1121–1154 |
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Active learning with a misspecified prior
Drew Fudenberg, Gleb Romanyuk, and Philipp Strack |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1155–1189 |
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Rational expectations and farsighted stability
Bhaskar Dutta and Rajiv Vohra |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1191–1227 |
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Capital-labor substitution, structural change and growth
Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, Ngo Long, and Markus Poschke |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1229–1266 |
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Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
Takeshi Momi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1267–1306 |
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Preference discovery and experimentation
Kevin Cooke |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1307–1348 |
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Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
Vitor Farinha Luz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1349–1391 |
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Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency
Fuhito Kojima and Takuro Yamashita |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1393–1438 |