|
Ranking by rating
Yves Sprumont |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–18 |
|
The limit of discounted utilitarianism
Adam Jonsson and Mark Voorneveld |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 19–38 |
|
Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules: the case of endogenous income
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Humberto Llavador |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 39–60 |
|
On path independent stochastic choice
David S. Ahn, Federico Echenique, and Kota Saito |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 61–86 |
|
High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring
Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 87–114 |
|
Dynamic project selection
Arina Nikandrova and Romans Pancs |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 115–144 |
|
Temptation with uncertain normative preference
John E. Stovall |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 145–174 |
|
Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
Sarah Auster |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 175–204 |
|
On asymmetric reserve prices
Maciej H. Kotowski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 205–238 |
|
Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
Yeon-Koo Che and Olivier Tercieux |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 239–272 |
|
Inefficient rushes in auctions
Angel Hernando-Veciana and Fabio Michelucci |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 273–306 |
|
Collusion constrained equilibrium
Rohan Dutta, David K. Levine, and Salvatore Modica |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 307–340 |
|
Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry
Peter Achim |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 341–376 |
|
Matching information
Hector Chade and Jan Eeckhout |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 377–414 |
|
Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté
Aviad Heifetz and Willemien Kets |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 415–465 |
|
Who's afraid of aggregating money metrics?
Kristof Bosmans, Koen Decancq, and Erwin Ooghe |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 467–484 |
|
Benchmarking
Christopher P. Chambers and Alan D. Miller |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 485–504 |
|
Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
Vincent Anesi and John Duggan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 505–526 |
|
Rational expectation of mistakes and a measure of error-proneness
Shaowei Ke |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 527–552 |
|
Computational principal agent problems
Pablo D. Azar and Silvio Micali |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 553–578 |
|
The transitive core: inference of welfare from nontransitive preference relations
Hiroki Nishimura |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 579–606 |
|
Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
Anton Kolotilin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 607–636 |
|
Exchange rates and monetary spillovers
Guillaume Plantin and Hyun Song Shin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 637–666 |
|
Collective household welfare and intra-household inequality
Jean-Paul Chavas, Martina Menon, Elisa Pagani, and Federico Perali |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 667–696 |
|
What kind of central bank competence?
Alex Frankel and Navin Kartik |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 697–728 |
|
Span of control, transaction costs and the structure of production chains
Tomoo Kikuchi, Kazuo Nishimura, and John Stachurski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 729–760 |
|
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition
Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 761–794 |
|
Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers
Heng Liu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 795–830 |
|
Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions
Phuong Le |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 831–868 |
|
Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure
Anton Tsoy |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 869–931 |
|
Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 933–950 |
|
Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 951–978 |
|
Pareto efficiency and identity
Christopher Phelan and Aldo Rustichini |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 979–1008 |
|
Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
Lars Ehlers and Alexander Westkamp |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1009–1042 |
|
Transitivity of preferences: when does it matter?
Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, and Bram De Rock |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1043–1076 |
|
Competition and networks of collaboration
Nikita Roketskiy |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1077–1110 |
|
Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
Arjada Bardhi and Yingni Guo |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1111–1150 |
|
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
David Martimort, Aggey Semenov, and Lars A. Stole |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1151–1190 |
|
Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1191–1232 |
|
Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1233–1274 |
|
On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
Gabriel Carroll |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1275–1318 |
|
The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
Yuichiro Waki, Richard Dennis, and Ippei Fujiwara |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1319–1368 |
|
A tractable model of monetary exchange with ex-post heterogeneity
Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Russell Wong |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1369–1424 |
|
A general solution method for moral hazard problems
Rongzhu Ke and Christopher Thomas Ryan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1425–1481 |