Volume 13 (2018)

Ranking by rating
        Yves Sprumont
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1–18
The limit of discounted utilitarianism
        Adam Jonsson and Mark Voorneveld
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19–38
Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules: the case of endogenous income
        Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Humberto Llavador
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39–60
On path independent stochastic choice
        David S. Ahn, Federico Echenique, and Kota Saito
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61–86
High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring
        Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan
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 Supplementary Appendix
87–114
Dynamic project selection
        Arina Nikandrova and Romans Pancs
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 Supplementary Appendix
115–144
Temptation with uncertain normative preference
        John E. Stovall
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145–174
Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
        Sarah Auster
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175–204
On asymmetric reserve prices
        Maciej H. Kotowski
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 Supplementary Appendix
205–238
Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
        Yeon-Koo Che and Olivier Tercieux
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239–272
Inefficient rushes in auctions
        Angel Hernando-Veciana and Fabio Michelucci
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 Supplementary Appendix
273–306
Collusion constrained equilibrium
        Rohan Dutta, David K. Levine, and Salvatore Modica
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 Supplementary Appendix
307–340
Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry
        Peter A. Wagner
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341–376
Matching information
        Hector Chade and Jan Eeckhout
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377–414
Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté
        Aviad Heifetz and Willemien Kets
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 Supplementary Appendix
415–465
Who's afraid of aggregating money metrics?
        Kristof Bosmans, Koen Decancq, and Erwin Ooghe
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467–484
Benchmarking
        Christopher P. Chambers and Alan D. Miller
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485–504
Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
        Vincent Anesi and John Duggan
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505–526
Rational expectation of mistakes and a measure of error-proneness
        Shaowei Ke
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527–552
Computational principal agent problems
        Pablo D. Azar and Silvio Micali
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553–578
The transitive core: inference of welfare from nontransitive preference relations
        Hiroki Nishimura
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579–606
Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
        Anton Kolotilin
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607–636
Exchange rates and monetary spillovers
        Guillaume Plantin and Hyun Song Shin
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637–666
Collective household welfare and intra-household inequality
        Jean-Paul Chavas, Martina Menon, Elisa Pagani, and Federico Perali
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667–696
What kind of central bank competence?
        Alex Frankel and Navin Kartik
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697–728
Span of control, transaction costs and the structure of production chains
        Tomoo Kikuchi, Kazuo Nishimura, and John Stachurski
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729–760
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition
        Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima
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761–794
Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers
        Heng Liu
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 Supplementary Appendix
795–830
Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions
        Phuong Le
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831–868
Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure
        Anton Tsoy
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 Supplementary Appendix
869–931
Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
        Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra
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933–950
Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
        Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov
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951–978
Pareto efficiency and identity
        Christopher Phelan and Aldo Rustichini
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979–1008
Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
        Lars Ehlers and Alexander Westkamp
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 Supplementary Appendix
1009–1042
Transitivity of preferences: when does it matter?
        Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, and Bram De Rock
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1043–1076
Competition and networks of collaboration
        Nikita Roketskiy
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1077–1110
Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
        Arjada Bardhi and Yingni Guo
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 Supplementary Appendix
1111–1150
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
        David Martimort, Aggey Semenov, and Lars A. Stole
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1151–1190
Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
        Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov
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1191–1232
Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
        Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart
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1233–1274
On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
        Gabriel Carroll
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1275–1318
The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
        Yuichiro Waki, Richard Dennis, and Ippei Fujiwara
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 Supplementary Appendix
1319–1368
A tractable model of monetary exchange with ex-post heterogeneity
        Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Russell Wong
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 Supplementary Appendix
1369–1424
A general solution method for moral hazard problems
        Rongzhu Ke and Christopher Thomas Ryan
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1425–1481