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Dynamic objective and subjective rationality
José Heleno Faro and Jean-Philippe Lefort |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–14 |
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On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules
Ryan Tierney |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 15–38 |
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Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
Shunya Noda |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 39–69 |
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Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
Joel Sobel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 71–102 |
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Boundedly rational backward induction
Shaowei Ke |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 103–134 |
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Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory
Juan I. Block, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 135–172 |
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A theory of personal budgeting
Simone Galperti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 173–210 |
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Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
Matthew L. Elliott and Francesco Nava |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 211–251 |
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Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Manuel Foerster |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 253–295 |
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On competitive nonlinear pricing
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 297–343 |
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Selling with evidence
Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 345–371 |
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Information and targeted spending
Jon X. Eguia and Antonio Nicolo |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 373–402 |
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Observational learning in large anonymous games
Ignacio Monzón |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 403–435 |
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Market selection in large economies: a matter of luck
Filippo Massari |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 437–473 |
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Efficiency and endogenous fertility
Mikel Pérez-Nievas, José I. Conde-Ruiz, and Eduardo L. Giménez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 475–512 |
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Communication and cooperation in repeated games
Yu Awaya and Vijay Krishna |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 513–553 |
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Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, and Xianwen Shi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 555–596 |
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Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
Ulrich Doraszelski and Juan F. Escobar |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 597–646 |
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Strategic experimentation in queues
Martin W. Cripps and Caroline D. Thomas |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 647–708 |
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A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms
Andrew Mackenzie |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 709–778 |
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Efficient partnership formation in networks
Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, and Mihai Manea |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 779–811 |
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Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
Martin Szydlowski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 813–847 |
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An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type
Shinsuke Kambe |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 849–886 |
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Disputes, debt and equity
Alfred J. M. Duncan and Charles Nolan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 887–925 |
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Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons
Sarah Auster and Piero Gottardi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 927–970 |
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Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification
Francisco Silva |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 971–1014 |
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The loser's curse in the search for advice
Pak Hung Au |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1015–1061 |
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Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships
Simon Loertscher and Cédric Wasser |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1063–1114 |
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Stochastic games with hidden states
Yuichi Yamamoto |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1115–1167 |
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"Convex preferences": a new definition
Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1169–1183 |
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Justifying optimal play via consistency
Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1185–1201 |
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Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Margaret Meyer, Inés Moreno de Barreda, and Julia Nafziger |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1203–1236 |
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Common enrollment in school choice
Mehmet Ekmekci and M. Bumin Yenmez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1237–1270 |
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On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction
Maarten Janssen and Bernhard Kasberger |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1271–1308 |
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School choice under partial fairness
Umut Dur, A. Arda Gitmez, and Özgür Yılmaz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1309–1346 |
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Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game
William H. Sandholm, Segismundo S. Izquierdo, and Luis R. Izquierdo |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1347–1386 |
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Enforcing social norms: Trust-building and community enforcement
Joyee Deb and Julio Gonzalez-Diaz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1387–1434 |
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Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond
Marco Battaglini and Rohit Lamba |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1435–1482 |
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Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments
David Austen-Smith, Wioletta Dziuda, Bård Harstad, and Antoine Loeper |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1483–1534 |
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Full substitutability
John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1535–1590 |