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∀ or ∃?
Uzi Segal |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–13 |
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Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, and Takuro Yamashita |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 15–36 |
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Stable matching: an integer programming approach
Chao Huang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 37–63 |
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On the neutrality of socially responsible investing
Lutz G. Arnold |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 65–95 |
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On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators
Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, and Hervé Moulin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 97–127 |
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Slow persuasion
Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 129–162 |
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Pervasive signaling
B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 163–196 |
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Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization
Siyang Xiong |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 197–230 |
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Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
Joel P. Flynn, Lawrence D. W. Schmidt, and Alexis Akira Toda |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 231–265 |
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Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
Hitoshi Sadakane |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 267–301 |
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Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization
Abraham Neyman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 303–340 |
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Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade
Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu, and Shin-Kun Peng |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 341–380 |
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Termination as an incentive device
Borys Grochulski and Yuzhe Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 381–419 |
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Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
Christoph Schottmüller |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 421–461 |
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The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
Tangren Feng, Axel Niemeyer, and Qinggong Wu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 463–479 |
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Equilibrium existence in games with ties
Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 481–502 |
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Interview hoarding
Vikram Manjunath and Thayer Morrill |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 503–527 |
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Subjective information choice processes
David Dillenberger, R. Vijay Krishna, and Philipp Sadowski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 529–559 |
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Loss aversion in sequential auctions
Antonio Rosato |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 561–596 |
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Distance on matchings: an axiomatic approach
Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, and Ton Storcken |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 597–632 |
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Multilevel marketing: pyramid-shaped schemes or exploitative scams?
Yair Antler |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 633–668 |
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Paying with information
Ayça Kaya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 669–706 |
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On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules
Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, and Afshin Nikzad |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 707–748 |
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Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy
Paweł Doligalski and Luis E. Rojas |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 749–791 |
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Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
Juan Sebastián Pereyra and Francisco Silva |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 793–836 |
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Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
Felix Brandt and Patrick Lederer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 837–883 |
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Bargaining with evolving private information
Juan Ortner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 885–916 |
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The winner-take-all dilemma
Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 917–940 |
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Time-consistent fair social choice
Kaname Miyagishima |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 941–964 |
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Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 965–991 |
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Optimal allocations with α-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory
Patrick Beissner and Jan Werner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 993–1022 |
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All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, and Alejandro Neme |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1023–1061 |
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Collective hold-up
Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1063–1100 |
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Unrestricted information acquisition
Tommaso Denti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1101–1140 |
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Strategic investment evaluation
Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1141–1180 |
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On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1181–1223 |
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Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
Ozan Candogan and Philipp Strack |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1225–1269 |
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Which misspecifications persist?
Drew Fudenberg and Giacomo Lanzani |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1271–1315 |
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Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
Hugo Hopenhayn and Maryam Saeedi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1317–1344 |
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Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1345–1373 |
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Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?
Mikel Pérez-Nievas |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1375–1406 |
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Conveying value via categories
Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1407–1439 |
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"Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game
Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1441–1474 |
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Information design in multi-stage games
Miltiadis Makris and Ludovic Renou |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1475–1509 |
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Attack and interception in networks
Francis Bloch, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Bhaskar Dutta |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1511–1546 |
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Surprise and default in general equilibrium
Keisuke Teeple |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1547–1583 |
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Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs
Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani, and Philipp Strack |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1585–1622 |
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Robust contracting under double moral hazard
Gabriel Carroll and Lukas Bolte |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1623–1663 |
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Generalized compensation principle
Karl Schulz, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Nicolas Werquin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1665–1710 |
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Stability in repeated matching markets
Ce Liu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1711–1757 |