Volume 17 (2022)

Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
        Mehmet Ekmekci and Stephan Lauermann
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1–23
Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
        Afshin Nikzad
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25–55
Informed intermediaries
        Paula Onuchic
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 Supplementary Appendix
57–87
Family ties: school assignment with siblings
        Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, and William Phan
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89–120
Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs
        Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione, and Shengxing Zhang
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121–152
Choosing what to pay attention to
        Chad Fulton
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153–184
Transparency and collateral: central versus bilateral clearing
        Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesca Carapella, and Francesco Carli
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185–217
Bayesian comparative statics
        Teddy Mekonnen and René Leal Vizcaíno
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219–251
Pseudo-Bayesian updating
        Chen Zhao
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253–289
Statistical sunspots
        William A. Branch, Bruce McGough, and Mei Zhu
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291–329
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule
        Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li
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331–369
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
        Heiner Schumacher and Heidi Christina Thysen
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371–414
Malthusian stagnation is efficient
        Juan Carlos Cordoba and Xiying Liu
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415–460
Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity
        Martin Hellwig
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461–506
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test
        Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson
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507–519
Two-stage majoritarian choice
        Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont
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521–537
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes
        Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb
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539–559
Censorship as optimal persuasion
        Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
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561–585
Monologues, dialogues and common priors
        Alfredo Di Tillio, Ehud Lehrer, and Dov Samet
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587–615
Games with switching costs and endogenous references
        Begum Guney and Michael Richter
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617–650
Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice
        Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid
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651–686
Dynamically stable matching
        Laura Doval
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687–724
Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
        Lukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, and Lukasz Wozny
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725–762
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
        Rahul Deb, Matthew Mitchell, and Mallesh M. Pai
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763–800
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
        Jan Christoph Schlegel
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801–839
A common-value auction with state-dependent participation
        Stephan Lauermann and Asher Wolinsky
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841–881
Long information design
        Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault, and Tristan Tomala
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883–927
Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs : correction
        Abhigyan Bose and Souvik Roy
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929–942
Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
        Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz
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943–953
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly
        Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes
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955–975
Informative tests in signaling environments
        Boaz Zik and Ran Weksler
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977–1006
Progressive participation
        Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
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1007–1039
Monotone contracts
        Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug
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1041–1073
Persuasion with unknown beliefs
        Svetlana Kosterina
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1075–1107
Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability
        Sylvain Chassang and Samuel Kapon
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1109–1143
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
        David Martimort and Lars A. Stole
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1145–1181
Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals
        Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park
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1183–1223
Value-based distance between information structures
        Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Pęski, and Jérôme Renault
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1225–1267
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems
        Kevin He
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1269–1312
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets
        Benjamin Lester, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Julien Hugonnier
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1313–1356
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
        Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira
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 Supplementary Appendix
1357–1401
Experimentation in Organizations
        Sofia Moroni
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1403–1450