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Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Mehmet Ekmekci and Stephan Lauermann |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–23 |
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Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
Afshin Nikzad |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 25–55 |
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Informed intermediaries
Paula Onuchic |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 57–87 |
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Family ties: school assignment with siblings
Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, and William Phan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 89–120 |
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Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs
Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione, and Shengxing Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 121–152 |
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Choosing what to pay attention to
Chad Fulton |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 153–184 |
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Transparency and collateral: central versus bilateral clearing
Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesca Carapella, and Francesco Carli |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 185–217 |
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Bayesian comparative statics
Teddy Mekonnen and René Leal Vizcaíno |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 219–251 |
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Pseudo-Bayesian updating
Chen Zhao |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 253–289 |
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Statistical sunspots
William A. Branch, Bruce McGough, and Mei Zhu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 291–329 |
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Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule
Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 331–369 |
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Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
Heiner Schumacher and Heidi Christina Thysen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 371–414 |
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Malthusian stagnation is efficient
Juan Carlos Cordoba and Xiying Liu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 415–460 |
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Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity
Martin Hellwig |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 461–506 |
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What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test
Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 507–519 |
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Two-stage majoritarian choice
Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 521–537 |
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Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes
Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 539–559 |
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Censorship as optimal persuasion
Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 561–585 |
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Monologues, dialogues and common priors
Alfredo Di Tillio, Ehud Lehrer, and Dov Samet |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 587–615 |
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Games with switching costs and endogenous references
Begum Guney and Michael Richter |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 617–650 |
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Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice
Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 651–686 |
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Dynamically stable matching
Laura Doval |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 687–724 |
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Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
Lukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, and Lukasz Wozny |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 725–762 |
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(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
Rahul Deb, Matthew Mitchell, and Mallesh M. Pai |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 763–800 |
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The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
Jan Christoph Schlegel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 801–839 |
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A common-value auction with state-dependent participation
Stephan Lauermann and Asher Wolinsky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 841–881 |
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Long information design
Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault, and Tristan Tomala |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 883–927 |
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Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs : correction
Abhigyan Bose and Souvik Roy |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 929–942 |
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Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 943–953 |
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Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly
Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 955–975 |
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Informative tests in signaling environments
Boaz Zik and Ran Weksler |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 977–1006 |
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Progressive participation
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1007–1039 |
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Monotone contracts
Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1041–1073 |
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Persuasion with unknown beliefs
Svetlana Kosterina |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1075–1107 |
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Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability
Sylvain Chassang and Samuel Kapon |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1109–1143 |
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Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
David Martimort and Lars A. Stole |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1145–1181 |
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Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals
Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1183–1223 |
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Value-based distance between information structures
Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Pęski, and Jérôme Renault |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1225–1267 |
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Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems
Kevin He |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1269–1312 |
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Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets
Benjamin Lester, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Julien Hugonnier |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1313–1356 |
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Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1357–1401 |
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Experimentation in Organizations
Sofia Moroni |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1403–1450 |
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How to sell in a sequential auction market
Ken Hendricks and Thomas Wiseman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1451–1471 |
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Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons
Chen Cheng and Yiqing Xing |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1473–1499 |
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Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
Heinrich Harald Nax and Jonathan Newton |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1501–1527 |
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Sufficientarianism
José Carlos R. Alcantud, Marco Mariotti, and Roberto Veneziani |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1529–1557 |
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Rational bubbles and middlemen
Yu Awaya, Kohei Iwasaki, and Makoto Watanabe |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1559–1587 |
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Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
Yi Chen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1589–1618 |
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Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning
Luciano Pomatto |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1619–1649 |
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On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings
Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1651–1682 |
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Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, and Siyang Xiong |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1683–1717 |
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Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1719–1760 |
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The implications of pricing on social learning
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, and Rann Smorodinsky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1761–1802 |
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When Walras meets Vickrey
David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher, and Claudio Mezzetti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1803–1845 |
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Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions
Wenzhang Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1847–1895 |